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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------oooOooo---------------
DALE RUCKER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ARLIN DALTON, Case No. 16082 
Defendant and Respondent. 
---------------oooOooo---------------
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT DALE RUCKER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was brought by appellant to recover damages 
for defective worlcrnanship of respondent arising out of a contract in 
which respondent was to construct an addition to a residence owned 
by appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, on August 24, 1978, the Judge having 
determined the matter to be an equitable proceeding. Appellant was 
granted judgment against respondent for plumbing deficiencies in the 
sum of $2,000. 00, as well as court costs in the sum of $114.80. 
Respondent's Counterclaim was dismissed, no cause of action. 
Appellant was not granted judgment for structural deficiencies in 
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the addition to the residence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision with respect 
to the structural deficiencies and the institution of a corresponding 
increase in the judgment by this Court in favor of appellant of 
$9,490.00 to a total judgment of $11,490.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1976, appellant, a retired high school 
auto mechanics instructor, approached respondent who misrepresented 
hilnself to be a licensed general contractor, and inquired about the 
possibility of respondent constructing an addition to a residence 
owned by the appellant. Appellant provided respondent with drawings 
of the floor plan for the addition. Respondent took the drawings and 
prepared a quotation, including material and labor required to 
construct the addition. 
Respondent's quotation being the lower of two quotations 
received by appellant, the appellant on July 19, 1976 accepted 
respondent's offer. The written agreement entered into by the parties 
called for a total contract price of $11,247.50, which was to be paid 
in installments. 
The respondent selected an excavation company to dig the 
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basement, contacted it to make arrangements for the digging, and 
construction on the addition began. The appellant was not consulted 
on the selection of the excavation company, nor in the decision upon 
how much it was to be paid. 
The respondent hired other employees to do work on the 
job, determined how much and when they were to be paid, without 
any consultation with the appellant. With respect to both the foundation 
and the lumber used in the project, the respondent was responsible 
for all decisions without consultation with the appellant. 
Appellant paid respondent $11,050.00, leaving a balance 
owed on the contract of $197.50, which balance appellant refused to 
pay until respondent completed the work by correcting the deficiencies 
in the home addition. Respondent refused to correct the deficiencies 
despite repeated requests by appellant. 
Appellant did not hire or pay any subcontractors for work 
included in the contract, Payments to respondent did not represent 
an hourly wage, but represented payments on the total contract price 
included in the agreement of July 19, 1976. Appellant never withheld 
income taxes or social security taxes from any payments made to 
respondent, nor did respondent ever submit time cards of hours 
worked to appellant. 
Appellant did not own or supply any of the tools used in 
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the construction of the addition, Appellant did not control the day to 
day activities of either the respondent or respondent's subcontractors, 
Respondent acknowledges that some general direction by an owner is 
to be expected. 
The parties agreed, and the contract so stated, that 
electrical work in the addition was not included in the contract. The 
parties also agreed orally that the heating work was likewise not 
included in the contract. 
The addition constructed by respondent contained several 
structural deficiencies. Many of those deficiencies were itemized in 
certified letters sent to the contractor, respondent, and to the owner, 
appellant, by the Provo Building Inspection Section, dated Jnne 21, 
1977. Shelby Adams, a building inspector for Provo City, testified 
that the City has not and will not approve the addition until all the 
deficiencies itemized in the June 21, 1977 letter are corrected. 
Thomas Wayne Smith, a building contractor licensed by 
the State of Utah for eight years testified that he examined the addition 
on the residence owned by appellant, and that he observed n=erous 
structural deficiencies. He formed an opinion as to the cost of the 
repair of those deficiencies so that the building would conform to the 
building code, and he submitted to appellant his estimate as to that 
cost. He testified that his estimate of $9,490. 00 did not include 
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plumbing repairs with the single exception of a $500.00 estinlate to 
repair a sewer line to fit and comply with the code. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES CREATED AN EMPLOYER-INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The general rule for determining whether or not an 
individual was acting as an employee or as an independent contractor 
is stated in 41 Am. Jur. Zd Independent Contractors § 5, pp. 744-745: 
" • it has generally been held that the 
test of what constitutes independent service 
lies in the control exercised, the decisive 
question being who has the right to direct 
what shall be done, and when and how it 
shall be done, It has also been held that 
commonly recognized tests of the 
independent contractor relationship, 
although not necessarily concurrent or each 
in itself controlling, are the existence of 
a contract for the performance by a 
person of a certain piece or kind of work 
at a fixed price, the independent nature 
of his business or his distinct calling, 
his employment of assistants with the 
right to supervise their activities, his 
obligation to furnish necessary tools, 
supplies, and mate rials, his right to 
control the progress of the work except 
as to final results, the time for which 
the workman is employed, the method 
of payment, whether by tiine or by job, 
and whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the employer." 
[Emphasis added] 
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In accord with the general rule discussed above, this Court 
has laid down guidelines for determining whether a party acted in the 
capacity of an employee or an independent contractor. In Harry L. 
Young and Sons, Inc. vs. Ashton, 538 P. 2d 316, (Utah, 1975), this 
Court in holding a truck driver to be an employee for purposes of 
workmen's compensation benefits, said the following: 
"Speaking in generality: An employee 
is one who is hired and paid a salary, 
a wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform 
the employer's work as directed by the 
employer and who is subject to a 
comparatively high degree of control 
in performing those duties. In contrast, 
an independent contractor is one who 
is engaged to do some particular 
project or piece of work, usually for 
a set total sum, who may do the job 
in his own way, subject to only 
miniinal restrictions or controls and 
is responsible only for its satisfactory 
completion. " 
(Emphasis added] (At 318] 
In Foster vs. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P. 2d 60 (1967), 
this Court in holding that a master-servant relationship did not exist 
between an oil company and service station operators, quoted the 
following language from 83 A. L. R. 2d 1284, Anno: Gasoline Dealer--
Status: 
"In general, the determinative question 
has usually been posed as one of 'control', 
the view being that if the defendant controls, 
or has the right of control, the manner in 
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which the operations are to be carried 
out, the defendant is liable as a master, 
while, if the control extends only to the 
result to be achieved, the actor is 
regarded as an independent contractor, .•• " 
[Emphasis added] [At 62] 
In Whyte vs. Christensen, 550 P. 2d 1289 (Utah, 1976), 
this Court made clear that the above-described test for determining 
the employer-independent contractor relationship was applicable in 
a residential construction project. In Whyte, supra, this Court 
reviewed certain jury instructions given by the trial court in aiding 
it to make a determination of the relationship between the defendant 
homeowner and plaintiff worker. The questions which were to be 
considered together by the jury in its determination were as follows: 
"1. Did the defendant have the right 
to control the work of the plaintiff. 
2. Did the defendant have the right to 
terminate David Whyte or any other 
craftsman at any time he saw fit? 
3. Was the plaintiff working for wages 
at an hourly rate, and did the defendant on 
prior occasions pay him his wages based 
on an hourly rate? 
4. Did the defendant have the right 
to make additions to the alterations to 
his home, or to subtract at any time 
from instructions given on a prior occasion?" 
[Id., at 1290] 
In Whyte, supra, the defendant had hired a fellow post 
office employee to assist him in the construction of an addition to 
his residence. The defendant had little experience in construction 
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work, but the plaintiff had substantial experience as a carpenter and 
builder, although he was not a licensed contractor. However, at this 
point, any slinilarity between Whyte, supra, and the instant case ends. 
In Whyte, supra, the plaintiff builder was to be paid at a flat hourly 
rate, as were his two sons who assisted in the construction work. In 
Whyte, supra, the homeowner was responsible for paying for all of 
the materials which were used in the construction project. In "Whyte, 
supra, construction work was not the worker's full time profession. 
In the instant case, the respondent was not paid on an hourly basis, but 
was paid a fixed contract price, including materials and labor which 
resulted from a written bid prepared by respondent. In the instant 
case, the respondent's full tline employment is in the construction 
trade. (R. 90) Plaintiff's Exhibit #5 is a card given to appellant by 
respondent which expressly states that respondent performed 
contracting work of all kinds, including "steel buildings, plastering, 
fireplaces, brick, concrete, marble crest, remodeling". As will be 
discussed subsequently, respondent's activities clearly demonstrate 
that he was acting as an independent contractor, and not as an 
employee. 
The fundamental significance of Whyte, supra, upon the 
instant case is that this Court applied the traditional test to a 
residential construction project and that the trial court instructions 
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pertaining to the test clearly indicate that the relationship in the 
instant case was that of an independent contractor. 
The Utah cases are consistent with other jurisdictions in 
the surrounding area. The cases make clear that the fundainental 
test is whether or not the employer has the right to control the day 
to day means through which the ends of the project are accomplished. 
Further, consistent with Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. vs. 
Ashton, supra, the cases are in agreement that the exercise of some 
limited control by an employer over work being done will not make 
a worker an employee, rather than an independent contractor. See 
Roybal vs. Bates Lumber Company, 76 N.M. 127, 412 P. 2d 555 
(1966); Scott vs. Murphy Corporation, 79 N.M. 697, 448 P. 2d 803 
(1969); Bowden vs. Robert V. Burggraf Construction Co., 375 P. 2d 
532 (Idaho, 1962); and Great American Insurance Company vs. 
General Insurance Company of America, 475 P. 2d 415 (Or., 1970). 
The case law discussed above leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that in the instant case the relationship between the parties 
was that of an employer-independent contractor. The evidence 
introduced at trial conclusively demonstrates that as a matter of law, 
the respondent was acting as an independent contractor. 
By the agreement dated July 19, 1976, (plaintiff's Exhibit 
#1 ), the respondent contractually obligated himself to construct a 
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16' x 37' addition to the east side of the appellant's home. He was not 
at liberty to begin construction without finishing the addition, as he 
was not receiving hourly wages for the work that was performed. In 
contrast, an employee can terminate his relationship with his employer 
at his own discretion, and is not obligated to complete the task that he 
was engaged in. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. vs. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, et al., 104 Utah 175, 134 P.Zd 479 (1943); Brubaker vs. 
Glenrock Lodge International Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P. Zd 52 
(Wyo., 1974). 
The respondent was responsible for hiring his own employees 
and subcontractors. In addition, appellant did not pay any of the 
subcontractors (R. 12). Respondent admits that he hired the 
excavator, as well as other employees without consulting the appellant, 
either with respect to whom was to be hired or how much they were 
to be paid (R. 93, 94). 
The contract price was fixed and included both material 
and labor charges. Appellant did not pay respondent an hourly wage 
(R. 12). Respondent admits that appellant never withheld any income 
taxes or social security taxes from any payments made to him, and 
that respondent never submitted any record of hours worked to the 
appellant (R. 114 ). 
The respondent modified construction plans on both the 
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roof a:od pllliTlbing (R. 13). 
Respondent also admits that some general direction and 
guidance by a homeowner is to be expected in any construction project 
ofthissort(R.llS). 
In its decision, the trial court necessarily concluded that 
the respondent had contractually obligated hiinself to perform the 
plwnbing work in the addition, and that as a result of defects in the 
plumbing work, was liable to the appellant for the reasonable. cost 
for repair. It is difficult to understand how the respondent can be 
an independent contractor on the plumbing, as per the agreement 
dated July 19, 1976, without also being an independent contractor for 
the balance of the items included in the July 19, 1976 agreement. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REACHED ITS DECISION 
BY FOCUSING UPON THE AMBIGUITY OF THE RESPONDENT'S 
OBLIGATIONS INSTEAD OF FOCUSING UPON THE 
MANNER IN WHICH THE RESPONDENT PERFORMED 
THOSE OBLIGATIONS. 
The trial court erroneously decided that the agreement was 
unclear as to the existence of the obligations of each party. In both 
the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact, the trial court 
stated that the plaintiff (appellant herein) had failed to establish the 
existence of the defendant 1 s (respondent herein) obligations resulting 
from the July 19, 1976 agreement between the parties, other than 
-11-
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with respecc to the plumbing. It concluded that it was unclear if 
respondent was responsible for the structural work and other work 
which was performed in a shoddy, unworkmanlike manner. 
Had the dispute arisen as to whether or not the agreement 
called for the respondent to perform certain obligations (as for 
example, was the respondent to wallpaper the drywall, or carpet the 
floors), the trial court's analysis would have merit. However, the 
dispute instead focuses upon whether the respondent performed his 
acknowledged responsibilities in a workmanlike proper fashion. The 
parties agree that the contract was binding upon them. The parties 
further agree that the heating and electrical work was to be excluded 
from the contract price. The agreement called for the respondent 
to build a 16' x 37' addition onto the existing dwelling. Although not 
specified in the agreement, the respondent was given and acknowledges 
receiving a drawing of the floor plan for the addition, (R. 94 ). It was 
this drawing he took to Anderson Lumber to price out materials, 
which along with labor charges became the basis of his quotation price. 
It is inconceivable that the trial court could acknowledge 
that the agreement between the parties obligated the respondent with 
respect to the plumbing without also obligating the respondent with 
respect to the other items contained in the agreement. It is 
significant that the plumbing estimate in the agreement represented 
-12-
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only S'", of the monies paid by the appellant to the respondent. Despite 
this, the trial court concluded that the other $10,000.00 paid to the 
respondent did not obligate the respondent any further. 
POINT III. 
THE ADDITION BUILT BY THE RESPONDENT HAD 
SUBSTANTIAL STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES 
FOR WHICH THE RESPONDENT IS RESPONSIBLE. 
The written agreement between the parties and the testimony 
at trial clearly demonstrate that the respondent obligated himself to 
construct a 16 1 x 37' addition on the side of the appellant's home. The 
agreement specifically obligated the respondent to supply the 
materials and labor for the construction of the structure. The 
agreement also shows that the respondent was obligated to perform 
the exterior masonry work for the addition. By his own admission, 
respondent acknowledges that he was responsible for plastering the 
interior walls (R. 96 ). 
Regardless of any potential ambiguity in the contract 
prepared by respondent, the evidence introduced at trial makes it 
clear that the respondent was to erect a finished addition on the 
appellant's residence. The only items in the construction project 
for which the respondent was not responsible were the electrical 
and heating activities. Respondent made arrangements for digging 
a basement, pouring the foundation, erecting the main frame, 
-13-
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building a roof, plastering the walls, installing the plwnbing and 
fi...~tures, and installing windows in the basement and on the main 
floor. Further, respondent was to place a marble finish on the 
exterior of the addition. (Plaintiff's Exhibit # 1, R. 96) 
The testimony and exhibits at trial clearly demonstrate 
that the addition built by respondent contains numerous structural 
and other deficiencies which must be corrected before the addition 
will meet the Provo building code. 
The Record makes it clear that the addition built by the 
respondent is a disaster. Shelby Adams, a building inspector for 
Provo City, testified that an inspection of the addition was made by 
the Provo City Building Inspection Section, and that numerous 
deficiencies were found. Those deficiencies were surrunarized in a 
certified letter sent to the respondent by the Building Inspection 
Section on June 21, 1977 (Plaintiff's Exhibit #6). In addition to 
various plwnbing deficiencies, numerous structural deficiencies were 
itemized, including: 
"1. No handrail combination on stairs to 
basement. 
2. Stair risers do not conform to code. 
They vary from 8-1/4" to 10-5/8" and 
treads are also irregular. 
3. Window wells are needed but missing. 
4. Shower floor is breaking up. 
5. Poor joists on window casings. 
6. Notching of floor joist in middle of span. 
-14-
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7. Sub-standard head room in stairway. 
8. Removed floor joist support. 
9. Bathroom door strike plate missing. 
10. Joints on sheetrock are miserable. 
11. Bathroom door and casing do not fit 
properly. 
12. Rear door casing is loose. 
13. No base shoe molding in hall and 
bedrooms. 
14. Floor underlayment not properly 
nailed in bedrooms. 
15. There is a 1-1/2" difference in floor 
level between existing and new. 
16. Window sill height 67-1/4" where 44" 
maximum is allowed. 
17. Sub-standard ceiling height. (7'1"). 
18. Irregular stair risers to furnace 
room (9 3/4" to 7 3/4"). 
19. Interior window between existing bath 
window and new hallway is not filled in. 
20. Stair stringers are inadequate." 
Mr. Adams further testified that the City has not approved, 
and will not approve the addition until the objections in the letter 
itemized above are corrected (R. 62). 
Numerous photographs contained in the Record herein 
were introduced as plaintiff's exhibits at trial. The photographs 
help illustrate the extremely shoddy workmanship associated with 
this construction project. All of the deficiencies revealed in the 
photographs are respondent's responsibility. None of the deficiencies 
are in any way related to any electrical and heating work. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #21 shows the exterior surface of the 
addition with numerous cracks running throughout the surface. 
-15-
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Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, #14, #15, and "'27 reveal the 
uneven and in smne cases crumbling plastering of the walls. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #29 shows the lack of support at the top 
of the stairway running down to the basement in the addition. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #l 0 shows the lack of window wells in 
the basement windows. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits #9 and #31 show the cuts in the supporting 
joists which resulted in a sagging in the main frame of the home. 
Mr. John Conway of the Utah Business Regulations and 
the Department of Contractors testified that on May 13, 1977, a 
meeting was held with Shelby Adams, Mr. Rucker, and hilnself, at 
which the mrrnerous deficiencies were itemized (R. 84). He further 
testified that the deficiencies originally itemized were found still to 
exist as of August 14, 1978, on which date various photographs 
depicting those deficiencies were taken in his presence (R. 84 ). 
Mr. Thomas W. Smith, an experienced licensed building 
contractor in the State of Utah, testified that he found various 
structural deficiencies in the addition (R. 73, 74). He further 
testified that he had prepared an estimate as to the repair costs for 
these structural deficiencies. The estilnate of $9,490.00 pertained 
exclusively to the structural deficiencies which he noted with the 
single exception of a $500.00 item for sewer repair (R. 76, 77). 
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Mr. Smith's qualifications to prepare an estimate are 
unchallenged. He has eight years experience as. a licensed building 
contractor in the State of Utah (R. 73). Further, he was familiar 
with the work that building the addition required because he had 
previously prepared a bid on the project (R. 75). 
The reasonableness of the repair estimate is readily 
demonstrable. In its judgment, the court awarded $2,000.00 in 
damages for repair to the plumbing whose original construction 
estimate was approximately $1, 000.00. Yet, as Mr. W. D. Pons 
testified, commenting on the cost of repairs: 
"Something like that amounts to 
two jobs. You have to disassemble 
it, and assemble it again. So, 
naturally, the cost might run up to 
double the amount ••• " 
[R. 68] 
Applying this analysis to the original construction estimate, 
the $9,490.00 repair estimate is quite reasonable, given the scope 
of repairs required to be made. 
POINT IV. 
HAVING BEEN HEARD BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A CASE IN 
EQUITY, THIS COURT MAY REVIEW THE FACTS, MAKE AN 
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THEM, Al'l"D GRANT 
JUDGMENT OF ITS OWN ACCORD. 
At the Pretrial Conference, the trial court characterized 
the proceedings as one in equity, and on this basis, a non-jury trial 
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was conducted. It is well established that this Court on appeal can 
render its own judgncent. 
The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, provides: 
"From all final judgments of the district 
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to 
the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be 
upon the record made in the court below 
and under such regulations as may be 
provided by law. In equity cases the appeal 
may be on questions of both law and fact; 
in cases at law the appeal shall be on 
questions of law alone. Appeals shall also 
lie from the final orders and decrees of 
the Court in the administration of 
decedent estates, and in cases of 
guardianship, as shall be provided by law. 
Appeals shall also lie from the final 
judgncent of justices of the peace in civil 
and criininal cases to the District Courts 
on both questions of law and fact, with such 
liinitations and restrictions as shall be 
provided by law; and the decision of the 
District Courts on such appeals shall be 
final, except in cases involving the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute." 
[Emphasis added] 
This Court has exercised its authority to issue its own 
judgment rather than remand for retrial in equitable actions. In 
Creer vs. Thurman, 581 P. 2d 149 (Utah, 1978), this Court reversed 
an order of the trial court awarding specific performance or dan1ages 
to the purchasers in a suit on an oral agreement to convey land. On 
appeal, this Court reviewed the trial record and held that the 
agreement to convey had been conditional, and which condition had 
not occurred. Accordingly, this Court reversed the order of the 
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trial court and entered judgment for tr_e defendant seller. 
This Court may enter judgment for appellant by 
determining that the judgment of the trial court was against the weight 
of the evidence, even if this Court should conclude that the evidence 
did not mandate judgment for the appellant in the trial court as a 
matter of law. Ream vs. Fitzen, 581 P. 2d 145 (Utah, 1978); Bear 
River State Bank vs. Merrill, 101 Utah 176, 120 P.2d 325 (1941). 
Sur rounding jurisdictions have adopted a similar position 
regarding the right of the appellate court to make an independent 
analysis of the facts in an equitable proceeding. ln Starr vs. 
International Realty, Ltd., 271 Or. 396, 533 P.2d 165 (1975), an 
equitable suit was brought by the partners in a real estate venture 
to require the realtor and promoter of the venture to render an 
accounting to the partnership for commissions from purchased real 
estate. In modifying the trial court judgment, the Oregon Supreme 
Court stated: 
"[A]lthough we accord great weight to 
the decision of the trial court on this 
question, as we ordinarily do on 
all such questions in suits in equity, 
it must be kept in mind that this is 
an appeal in a suit in equity, which 
we try de novo. 11 
[Id., at 170] 
CONCLUSION 
The agreement between the parties created an employer-
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independent CG7lt~·actor reL2~1 <lS~:ip as a rnaltcr of ld.\'/. J\ revie\v of 
the evidence clearly indica:e e :ha: all of the factors point111g towards 
an independent contractor determination arc= applicable to the 
respondent i.'1 the instant case. _;,.,s such, the respondent is responsib), 
for all of the deficient construction pursuant to the contract between 
the parties. 
The evidence clearly i.'l.dicates that the agreement entered 
into between the parties placed substantial obligations upon the 
respondent, The evidence further indicates that the respondent 
performed these obligations in a shoddy unworkrnanlike manner 
resulting in serious structural deficiencies to the addition, 
Employees of both the Provo Building Inspection Section 
and the Utah Department of Contractors testified as to the existence 
of these deficiencies, and indicated that these deficiencies must be 
corrected before the Provo City Building Inspection Section will 
approve the addition, Costs of repair of these deficiencies was 
determined by a licensed building contractor for the State of Utah 
with eight years experience. The reasonableness of this repair 
e stiinate was unchallenged. 
Even if this Court should be unable to conclude that as a 
matter of law respondent is responsible for these structural 
deficiencies, this Court may reverse the decision of the trial court 
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2:1c: institute judl!;ment for appellant. Article VIII, Section 9 of the 
C:2'1 Constitution authorizes this Court to make an independent analysis 
of both the law and the facts in equitable proceedings. Having been 
determined to be an equitable proceeding at the trial court, this 
Court may institute judgment for appellant either as a matter of law 
or as a result of making its own appraisal of the facts in this equitable 
proceeding. 
Appellant requests this Court to institute an increase in the 
judgment in favor of appellant of $9,490.00 for a total of $11,490.00 
against respondent as a result of the deficient workmanship in the 
addition for which respondent is responsible. 
Dated this 5th day of December, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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